Introduction to The Tor Ecosystem

Privacy, Anonymity, and Anti-censorship

Alexander Færøy October 30, 2019

Swiss Web Security Day



About Me

- Core Developer at The Tor Project since early 2017.
- Free Software developer since 2006.
- Worked with distributed systems in the Erlang programming language, WebKit-based mobile browsers, embedded development, and software development consulting.
- Co-organizing the annual Danish hacker festival BornHack.



What is Tor?

- Online anonymity, and censorship circumvention.
 - Free software.
 - Open network.
- Community of researchers, developers, users, and relay operators.
- U.S. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization.




History


1990s	Onion routing for privacy online.
Early 2000s	Working with the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.
2004	Sponsorship by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
2006	The Tor Project, Inc. became a non-profit.
2007	Expansion to anti-censorship.
2008	Tor Browser development.
2010	The Arab spring.
2013	The summer of Snowden.
2018	Dedicated anti-censorship team created


Somewhere between 2,000,000 and 8,000,000 daily users.


















What can the attacker do?










Anonymity isn't Encryption



Encryption just protects contents.


Metadata




"We Kill People Based on Metadata."

 $-{\it Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA.}$

Different Purposes of Anonymity




A Simple Design




Equivalent to some commercial proxy providers.


A Simple Design




A Simple Design




Timing analysis bridges all connections going through the relay.




Add multiple relays so that no single relay can betray Alice.




Alice picks a path through the network: R_1 , R_2 , and R_3 before finally reaching Bob.




Alice makes a session key with R_1 .



Alice asks R_1 to extend to R_2 .





Alice asks R_2 to extend to R_3 .



Alice finally asks R_3 to connect to Bob.

- An open network everybody can join!
- Between 6000 and 7000 relay nodes.
- Kindly hosted by various individuals, companies, and non-profit organisations.
- 9 Directory Authority nodes and 1 Bridge Authority node.





Source: metrics.torproject.org

Number of Relays




Source: metrics.torproject.org

Tor's **safety** comes from **diversity**:

- 1. Diversity of relays. The more relays we have and the more diverse they are, the fewer attackers are in a position to do traffic confirmation.
- 2. Diversity of users and reasons to use it. 50,000 users in Iran means almost all of them are normal citizens.

Research problem: How do we measure diversity over time?

Number of Relays per Platform




I'm a doctor in a very political town. I have patients who work on legislation that can mean billions of dollars to major telecom, social media, and search concerns.

When I have to do research on diseases and treatment or look into aspects of my patients' histories, I am well aware that my search histories might be correlated to patient visits and leak information about their health, families, and personal lives. I use Tor to do much of my research when I think there is a risk of correlating it to patient visits.

—Anonymous Tor User.

A modified version of Firefox Extended Support Release (ESR).

- Includes Tor, Pluggable Transports, and support extensions.
- Includes EFF's HTTPS Everywhere extension to protect against malicious Exit node operators.
- Includes No Script to protect against various attacks from JavaScript code.




The philosophy behind the design choices in Tor Browser:

- Preserve existing user model.
- Favor changes that are least likely to break sites.
- Plugins must be restricted.
- Minimize Global Privacy Options.
- No filters.
- Stay current.

The security requirements are primarily concerned with ensuring the safe use of Tor.

- Proxy Obedience.
- State Separation.
- Disk Avoidance.
- Application Data Isolation.



Focus on strong privacy protection:

- Cross-Origin Identifier Unlinkability.
- Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability.
- Long-Term Unlinkability.

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0

The Tor Browser

Attribute	Value
User agent 1	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Fedora; Linux x86_64; rv:67.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/67.0
Accept 1	text/html, application/xhtml+xml, application/xml; q=0.9,"/"; q=0.8
Content encoding 6	gzip, deflate, br
Content language 6	en-US,en;q=0.5
List of plugins 6	
Platform 6	Linux x86_64
Cookies enabled 9	yes
Do Not Track 🚯	yes
Timezone 6	-120
Screen resolution 6	1920x1080x24
Use of local storage 6	yes
Use of session storage 0	yes
Canvas 6	Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz, U Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz, U
WebGL Vendor 6	Intel Open Source Technology Center
WebGL Renderer 6	Mesa DRI Intel(R) UHD Graphics 620 (Kabylake GT2)

Firefox 60

Attribute	Value
User agent 1	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0
Accept 1	text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9;/*;q=0.8
Content encoding ()	gzip, deflate
Content language 0	en-US,en;q=0.5
List of plugins 6	
Platform 6	Linux x86_64
Cookies enabled 9	yes
Do Not Track 🚯	NC
Timezone 6	0
Screen resolution $oldsymbol{9}$	1000x900x24
Use of local storage 🚯	yes
Use of session storage 9	yes
Canvas 9	
WebGL Vendor 1	Not supported
WebGL Renderer 6	Not supported

Tor Browser

I live in Iran and I have been using Tor for censorship circumvention. During political unrest while the government tightens grip on other censorship circumvention alternatives, Tor with obfuscation plugins remains the only solution.

Tor changed my personal life in many ways. It made it possible to access information on Youtube, Twitter, Blogger and countless other sites. I am grateful of Tor project, people working on it as well as people running Tor nodes.

—Anonymous Tor User.



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Sorry, the requested page is

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تصفح بأميان!

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تشكل شبكة الانترنت وسبلة للتواصل والمعرفة وخدمة متطلبات حياتنا اليومية. وقد تم حجب الموقع الذي ترغب يدخوله لاشتماله مجتوى مدرج تجب "فتات المحتوبات المحظورة" حسب تصنيف السياسة التنظيمية لإدارة النفاذ للإنترنت" لمبثة تنظيم الاتصالات بدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة.

إذا كانت لديك وجعة نظر مختلفة، الرجاء الأقر هنا.

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This website is not accessible in the HAF.

The Internet is a newarful medium for communication sharing and serving our daily learning needs. However, the site you are trying to access contains content that is archibited under the 'Internet Access Management Regulatory Policy' of the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of the United Arab Emirates.

If you believe the website you are trying to access does not contain any such content planes click here



Access Denied

our request was denied because of its content categorization: "Computers/Internet;Proxy Avoida

عزيزي العمل: تم حجب هذا الموقع بناء على اللوائح والقوانيي













Introduction to Censorship

Censored Region




Bob




Alice is unable to reach Bob.

Introduction to Censorship



Introduction to Censorship




Anti-censorship Strategies


- 1. Censors will apply censorship to **all** relays in the network and effectively block access to the Tor network.
- 2. Censors will apply censorship to **known** bridges.

Solution: We make it difficult to find and block bridges and we make it difficult to learn if a given connection is between a Tor user and an entry-point into the Tor network.


Bridges



Bridges



Bridges and Pluggable Transports




Pluggable Transports

- Allows people to easily build, experiment, and deploy their own obfuscation technology without having to modify the Tor source code itself.
- The specification for Pluggable Transports is open and allows other vendors to implement support for PTs in their own products.
- Allows people to experiment with different transports for Tor that might not be doing any anti-censorship related obfuscation.

Obfourscator (obfs4)

- Makes it hard for passive DPI to verify the presence of the obfs4 protocol unless the adversary knows the bridge parameters.
- Makes active probing hard unless the adversary knows the bridge parameters.
- Uses Tor's ntor handshake (x25519), but uses Elligator2 to encode the elliptic-curve points to be indistinguishable from uniform random strings. The link layer encryption uses NaCl secret boxes (XSalsa20 and Poly1305).

SNI Domain Fronting using Meek



SNI Domain Fronting using Meek

Very **efficient**, but **expensive** :-(

Unpopular with the cloud providers:

Google Never been a supported feature of Google.

Amazon Already handled as a breach of AWS ToS.

Domain Fronting in the Future?

- Use Encrypted SNI?
- Use message queue services hosted by the different cloud providers?
- Generally continue to use centralized services to give people in censored areas access.

Bridge Distribution

BridgeDB The Tor Project

```
Step 1 Download Tor Browser

Step 2 Get bridges

Step 3 Now add the bridges to Tor Browser
```

What are bridges?


Bridges are Tor relays that help you circumvent censorship.

I need an alternative way of getting bridges!

Another way to get bridges is to send an email to bridges@torproject.org. Please note that you must send the email using an address from one of the following email providers: Riseup or Gmail.

Source: bridges.torproject.org

Bridge Distribution using Moat




Censored Region

Alice



Snowflake PT Client




Censored Region


Alice





Snowflake PT Client


Snowflake Broker















Open Observatory of Network Interference











Check it out at explorer.ooni.io

Tor is not foolproof

- Operational security mistakes.
- Browser metadata fingerprinting.
- Browser exploits.
- Traffic analysis.

How can you help?

- Run a Tor relay or a bridge!
- Teach others about Tor and privacy in general.
- Find, and maybe fix, bugs in Tor.
- Test Tor on your platform of choice.
- Work on some of the many open research projects.
- Donate at donate.torproject.org



Questions?



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